

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
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FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5999
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0577

NODIS CHEROKEE

WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESIDENT AND BRZEZINSKI ONLY FROM ASSTSEC
MOOSE: STATE DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SO, MASS
SUBJ: MEETING WITH SIAD

REF: STATE 70318

1. I MET ALONE WITH SIAD BARRE AT HIS COMPOUND LAST NIGHT
FOR FOUR AND ONE-QUARTER HOURS ENDING AT 0215 HRS THIS MORNING.
THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PRINCIPAL POINTS (FULL REPORT WILL FOLLOW)

2. I DELIVERED IN DETAIL EVERY POINT IN MY INSTRUCTIONS
(REFTEL) THROUGH PARA 14.

3. AFTER A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE KEY QUESTION OF
ASSURANCES (PARAS 8, 9 AND 11 REFTEL) SIAD VOLUNTEERED
THE FOLLOWING FORMULA:

BEGIN QUOTE: WE WILL NOT USE FORCE AGAINST ANY NEIGHBORING
COUNTRY. WE WILL NOT USE THE WEAPONS YOU GIVE US AGAINST
ANY NEIGHBORING COUNTRY, OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY, UNLESS THEY
USE FORCE AGAINST US. END QUOTE. SIAD THEREAFTER RE-
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ITERATED THIS COMMITMENT THREE TIMES. IN RESPONSE TO MY
DIRECT QUESTION HE STATED THAT WE COULD QUOTE IT PUBLICLY
AND VOLUNTEERED THE SUGGESTION THAT WE COULD EXPLAIN THAT
IT MEANS THE SAME THING AS A RECOGNITION OF BORDERS.
SIAD ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD TELL ME PRIVATELY THAT
HE DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI BORDER BECAUSE
TO DO SO WOULD BE A QUOTE JURIDICAL ABSURDITY SINCE THERE IS

NO RECOGNIZED BORDER UNQUOTE. (THE LATTER CONTENTION IS, OF COURSE, A FACT).

4. WHEN, PURSUANT TO PARA 8 REFTTEL, I CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST THAT HE QUOTE REAFFIRM YOUR GOVERNMENT'S ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UN AND OAU CHARTERS AND SPECIFICALLY THAT YOU GIVE THE UNITED STATES YOUR ASSURANCE THAT SOMALIA WILL RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF HER NEIGHBORS UNQUOTE SIAD MADE THESE COMMENTS:

A. QUOTE DON'T MAKE CONDITIONS WHICH I CANNOT ACCEPT... FORCING US TO MAKE SUCH A DECLARATION WILL ONLY GIVE AN ADVANTAGE TO THE SOVIETS. I FEEL THAT I AM STRONGER THAN THE PEOPLE WHO THE SOVIETS LEFT HERE BUT SUCH A DECLARATION WILL WEAKEN US END QUOTE. B. SIAD SAID THAT QUOTE WE TALK TOO MUCH ABOUT THE OAU UNQUOTE AND HE THEN RECOUNTED THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 1964 CAIRO OAU SUMMIT MEETING AT WHICH SOMALIA RESERVED ITS POSITION ON THE BORDERS QUESTION. WE ALSO DISCUSSED KENYA-SOMALI RELATIONS WITHOUT ANY NOTABLE DEPARTURE FROM KNOWN SOMALI POLICY. SIAD SAYS HE HAS DONE ALL HE WILL DO VIS A VIS THE KENYANS; THAT HE HAS NO CLAIM ON KENYAN TERRITORY AND THEREFORE HAS NOTHING TO RENOUNCE -- HE RECOUNTS MULTIPLE EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE KENYANS BUT CONCLUDES THAT MOI, NJONJO ET AL AREA USING THE SOMALI-KENYA ISSUE TO JOCKEY FOR POSITION AS KENYATTA'S SUCCESSOR.

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5. IN RESPONSE TO MY EXPRESSION OF CONCERN ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUED SOMALI SUPPORT OF THE WSLF, SIAD IMPORED US TO QUOTE SAY NOTHING MORE ABOUT THE WSLF. DON'T CONDEMN THEM OR DENY THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT IF HE WERE TO SAY A WORD AGAINST THEM HE "WOULD NOT LIVE A DAY" GIVEN STRENGTH OF SUPPORT FOR THEM WITHIN SOMALIA.

6. I TOLD SIAD THAT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM AGAIN TO CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION OF THE ASSURANCES QUESTION AND HE READILY AGREED. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PRESENT FORMALLY THE TEXT OF A REVISED EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT ON US DEFENSE ARTICLES ALONG THE LINES AUTHORIZED AND ASK FOR ITS FORMAL ACCEPTANCE. SUCH REVISION WOULD INCLUDE A NEW FORMULATION INCORPORATING THE COMMITMENT WHICH PRESIDENT SIAD GAVE ME THIS EVENING (PARA 3 ABOVE). I BELIEVE THAT SUCH A REVISION COULD BE REGARDED AS SATISFYING OUR LEGAL AND PLLITICAL REQUIREMENTS THAT SOMALIA RESPECT THE QUOTE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF HER NEIGHBORS UNQUOTE BY RENOUNCING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THEM. IN MY VIEW THIS FORMULATION IS AT LEAST AS MEANING-

FUL AS A REAFFIRMATION OF THE UN AND OAU CHARTERS IN RE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. I AM PERSUADED THAT THIS IS ABSOLUTELY THE
MOST SIAD WILL GIVE. IT IS, IN FACT, MORE THAN I HAD EXPECTED.
IF IT IS YOUR JUDGEMENT THAT WE CAN STAND ON THIS FORMULATION,
I COULD SUBMIT A REVISED LETTER TO HIM BEFORE I DEPART AND
POSSIBLY OBTAIN HIS WRITTEN ACCEPTANCE. PROPOSED REVISED TEXT
FOLLOWS:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE THE HONOR TO REFER TO RECENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN
REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING THE
CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
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TO THE FURNISHING OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES
TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC UNDER
THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES.
(NEW PARAGRAPH) IN ORDER FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH
TO SOMALIA SUCH DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES AND IN ACCOR-
DANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES LEGISLATION GOVERNING THE FOREIGN
MILITARY SALES PROGRAM, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC TO ASSURE
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT IT WILL REFRAIN FROM
THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST ANY OF ITS NEIGHBORS AND THAT
IT WILL NOT USE US DEFENSE ARTICLES OR SERVICES OR PERMIT
THEIR USE, FOR ANY PURPOSES OTHER THAN THE INTERNAL
SECURITY OR LEGITIMATE DEFENSE OF THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC; AND ALSO, WITH RESPECT TO ANY DEFENSE ARTICLES
AND DEFENSE SERVICES SO FURNISHED, THAT IT:

1) WILL NOT TRANSFER TITLE TO OR POSSESSION OF THEM
TO ANYONE NOT AN OFFICER, EMPLOYEE OR AGENT OF THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, WITHOUT FIRST
OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT;

2) WILL MAINTAIN THEIR SECURITY AND WILL PROVIDE
SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME DEGREE OF SECURITY PROTECTION
AFFORDED TO SUCH ARTICLES AND SERVICES BY THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT.

IN ORDER TO ASSIST THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO
REACH A DECISION IN THIS MATTER, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL
TO HAVE THE CONFIRMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOMALI
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC THAT IT ACCEPTS THE FOREGOING ASSURANCES
AS CONDITIONS FOR THE FURNISHING OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND
DEFENSE SERVICES UNDER THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM
OF THE UNITED STATES. ACCORDINGLY, I HAVE THE HONOR TO
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REQUEST THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY CONFIRM YOUR GOVERNMENT'S
ACCEPTANCE OF THOSE CONDITIONS.

SINCERELY YOURS,
RICHARD M. MOOSE
SPECIAL EMISSARY OF THE PRESIDENT

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ACTION NODS-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6000
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0577

NODIS CHEROKEE

WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESIDENT AND BRZEZINSKI ONLY FROM ASSTSEC
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7. BECAUSE IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO ME WHETHER SIAD'S
ASSURANCE WOULD MEET OUR REQUIREMENT, I DID NOT DISCUSS
WITH HIM THE CONTENT OF THE FIRST TWO TICKS UNDER
PARA 15 REFTTEL CONCERNING A DEFENSE SURVEY TEAM AND NON-
LETHAL PACKAGE. WE DID, HOWEVER, HAVE A BRIEF DISCUSSION
OF HIS MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. HE IDENTIFIED HIS MOST
PRESSING MATERIAL NEED AS ARTILLERY, ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS. HE
CONSIDERS THE NORTH TO BE THE AREA OF GREATEST THREAT
BECAUSE, IN HIS VIEW, THE SOVIETS WILL WISH TO REGAIN
USE OF THE FACILITIES IN THE BERBERA AREA.

8. SIAD SUGGESTED THAT BEFORE WE ANNOUNCE ANY AGREE-
MENT ON ARMS SUPPLY WE SHOULD SPEAK TO THE ARABS
SO THAT THEY CAN SEND HIM WHAT THEY CAN QUICKLY. I TOLD

HIM THAT IN THE EVENT WE REACH AGREEMENT WE WOULD FOLLOW-
UP ON HIS SUGGESTION.

9. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION:

SIAD'S LANGUAGE APPEARS TO ME TO BE THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIV-
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ALENT OF OUR SUGGESTED FORMULATION WITH THE ADDED ADVANTAGE
OF HIS AGREEMENT TO ITS PUBLICATION. THERE REMAINS, OF
COURSE, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE CAN BELIEVE HIM. BUT
WE WOULD HAVE HAD THIS PROBLEM IN ANY CASE, IN FACT,
HAD HE BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING, I WOULD HAVE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED
HIS SINCERITY. AS IT WAS, I HAD THE IMPRESSION OF A MAN
WRESTLING WITH THE PROBLEM OF SATISFYING OUR REQUIREMENTS
WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS POLITICAL POSITION OR COMPROMISING
HIS COMMITMENT TO WHAT ALL SOMALIS REGARD AS THEIR OBLI-
GATIONS TO THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THEIR BROTHERS.
FINALLY, IN THIS REGARD, WHILE SIAD WAS LESS THAN REASSURING
WITH REGARD TO HIS INTENTIONS TOWARD THE WSLF, HE WAS
FORTHRIGHT. THIS IS THE MOST SENSITIVE NERVE OF ALL AND
IT MAY NOT BEAR ANY FURTHER PROBING. I MADE CLEAR TO HIM,
HOWEVER, OF THE SERIOUS EFFECT ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS
AND ESPECIALLY THE MILITARY SUPPLY ASPECT WHICH SUPPORT
FOR A WSLF ENGAGED IN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITY AGAINST
ETHIOPIA MUST HAVE.

10. SIAD CLEARLY WANTS OUR SUPPORT FOR MORALE AS WELL
AS MATERIAL REASONS. I THINK THAT HE UNDERSTANDS OUR
CONCERNS AND IS TRYING TO MEET THEM AS WELL AS ANY
SOMALI COULD UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WOULD HAVE US
BELIEVE THAT WITHOUT A PROMPT DEMONSTRATION OF US SUPPORT
SOVIET INFLUENCE WILL REASSERT ITSELF IN SOMALIA AND
THEN HE WILL BE FORCED OUT. HIS TONE REFLECTED SOME
OF THE SAME RESIGNATION WHICH AMBASSADOR LOUGHRAN
ENCOUNTERED LAST WEEK AND HIS APPROACH LACKED THE INVERTED
REASONING AND SELF-DECEPTION WHICH WE HAVE HEARD
SO OFTEN. HE DOES, OF COURSE, COMPLETELY IGNORE SOMALIAS
OWN ROLE IN PRECIPITATING THE CRISIS WHICH BROUGHT THE
SOVIETS AND CUBANS TO THE HORN. HIS POINT OF DEPARTURE
IS THE PRESENT SITUATION PORTRAYED AGAINST A BACKDROP
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OF WHAT HE SEES AS A SOVIET PLAN TO IMPOSE ITS POWER
IN THE AREA BY A COMBINATION OF DESTABILIZING AND
INTIMIDATING ACTIONS BACKED UP BY THE CAPABILITY AND

WILL TO USE ITS OWN AND CUBAN FORCE WHERE NECESSARY.
HIS SUMMATION, ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT, WAS, QUOTE
IF YOU WANT TO HELP US, DO IT. IF YOU CAN'T HELP US,
TELL US SO, UNQUOTE.

11. IF WE ARE TO WRAP THIS UP WHILE I AM HERE -- AND IF
IT IS TO BE DONE, THIS IS THE TIME -- PROMPT DECISIONS
WILL BE REQUIRED. GIVEN THE 8 HOUR TIME DIFFERENCE, I
CANNOT EXPECT TO HAVE YOUR ANSWER IN TIME TO DO ANYTHING
WITH SIAD TODAY (MONDAY), NOTWITHSTANDING HIS PREDEL-
ICTION FOR WORKING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS. THUS, I
WILL TENTATIVELY PLAN TO REMAIN INTO WEDNESDAY, BUT
REQUEST DEPARTMENT GIVE ME AN INTERIUM REACTION AND
BEST ESTIMATE OF WHEN I MAY EXPECT A RESPONSE. IF
WASHINGTON RESPONSE IS TRANSMITTED BY THE END OF YOUR
WORKING DAY TODAY, I COULD SCHEDULE A TUESDAY AFTERNOON
OR EVENING APPOINTMENT AND HAVE WEDNESDAY FOR JIDDA.
LOUGHRAN

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